The influence of social forces: evidence from the behavior of football referees by Dohmen, T.J.
  
 
The influence of social forces: evidence from the
behavior of football referees
Citation for published version (APA):
Dohmen, T. J. (2008). The influence of social forces: evidence from the behavior of football referees.
Economic Inquiry, 46(3), 411-424. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00112.x
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2008
DOI:
10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00112.x
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL FORCES: EVIDENCE FROM THE
BEHAVIOR OF FOOTBALL REFEREES
THOMAS J. DOHMEN*
Analyzing the neutrality of referees during 12 German premier league
(1. Bundesliga) soccer seasons, this paper documents evidence that social forces
influence agents’ decisions. Referees, who are appointed to be impartial, tend to
favor the home team by systematically awarding more stoppage time in close
matches in which the home team is behind. They also favor the home team in
decisions to award goals and penalty kicks. Crowd composition affects the size
and the direction of the bias, and the crowd’s proximity to the field is related to
the quality of refereeing. (JEL J00)
I. INTRODUCTION
Do social forces affect decisions or actions
of individuals? And if so, under what circum-
stances do social influences determine socio-
economic behaviors? These are important
questions for economists to answer. Sociolo-
gists and social psychologists widely acknowl-
edge that individuals’ decisions are not only
governed by their material payoffs but also
influenced by nonmaterial social payoffs that
arise in the decision makers’ social environ-
ment, for example, in the form of social
approval or social sanctions, as argued, for
example, by Asch (1951) or Coleman (1990).
This type of social pressure can cause individ-
uals to make decisions that accommodate the
preferences of a social group even if they are
not in accordance with the decision maker’s
own interest. I refer to this view as the ‘‘social
pressure hypothesis.’’
Economists have built on the idea that
social forces might affect individual behavior
and have developed models of social interac-
tion in which the quest for social rewards or
the avoidance of social sanctions can explain
adherence to social custom as, for example, in
Akerlof (1980) as well as the evolution and
persistency of social norms as in Bernheim
(1994).1 In these models, social payoffs, which
comprise social approval or sanctions, become
an argument in the utility function in addition
to intrinsic consumption utility, which captures
material payoffs. Several other scholars (e.g.,
Becker and Murphy 2000) have used such
a framework that generalizes an individual’s
utility function to internalize social payoffs
*I am grateful to IMP AG for providing the data. I
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Wendland for their cooperation. I am also indebted to
the DFB, particularly to Klaus Lo¨w, for providing
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two anonymous referees, and the editor for helpful com-
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ABBREVIATION
DFB: German Football Association
1. Akerlof (1980) argues that social sanctions can
induce an individual to adhere to a social custom even
at the cost of forgoing pecuniary gains from breaking
it. In Bernheim’s (1994) model, individuals care about
social rewards in addition to their intrinsic consumption
utility, and conform to a single homogenous standard
of behavior if social rewards are sufficiently important rel-
ative to their intrinsic utility. Adherence to a norm and
persistency of a norm are determined by the distribution
of intrinsic preferences.
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to analyze how social influences affect a variety
of socioeconomic behaviors, consumption,
status, as well as the evolution of norms, fads,
and fashions.2
Despite much theoretical progress, there is
little empirical evidence that convincingly
assesses the role of social influences, not least
because data that meet the necessary require-
ments are scarce.3 A useful type of data would
record how a decision maker behaves in differ-
ent social environments, where different social
groups have well-defined, and potentially
conflicting, interests that are not aligned with
the interests of the individual decision maker.
Garicano, Palacios-Huerta, and Prendergast
(2005) exploit the fact that soccer matches
offer such a setting and provide one of the
few pieces of empirical evidence. In a soccer
match, it is in the referee’s private interest
to be impartial while fans in each camp derive
utility from their team’s success and therefore
have an interest to work toward their common
goal by sanctioning referee decisions that do
not favor their preferred team and by ap-
proving favorable decisions. Analyzing data
from two seasons of the Spanish premier soc-
cer league, the Primera Division, Garicano,
Palacios-Huerta, and Prendergast (2005)
detect that Spanish referees favor the home
team by prolonging the match by almost 2
min when the home team is one goal behind
at the end of regulation time compared to
the situation in which the home team is leading
by one goal. They also investigate whether
crowd size and the ratio of attendance-to-
capacity matters and find that a one standard
deviation increase in attendance increases the
bias by about 20%, while a higher attendance-
to-capacityratioreducesthebias.Theyconclude
that nonmonetary incentives, in particular
social pressure from the crowd, cause the pref-
erential treatment.4 Sutter and Kocher (2004)
report corroborative findings based on data
from the 2000 to 2001 season in the German
premier soccer league (1.Bundesliga), although
they do not assess whether crowd attributes
affect the magnitude and significance of
home-biased refereeing.
This paper provides complementary evi-
dence of referee bias based on data from
3,519 games of the 1. Bundesliga, which sup-
ports the view that the social environment
can affect individual’s decisions. The empirical
analysis that professional referees, who are
appointed and paid by the German Football
Association (DFB) and are expected to be
impartial, in fact systematically favor the
home team. Favoritism is manifested in stop-
page time decisions and in decisions to award
goals and penalty kicks. The data also provide
new evidence that crowd characteristics such
as crowd composition and distance to the soc-
cer field impair referees’ decisions in a way that
is consistent with the social pressure hypo-
thesis, that is, that social forces influence
individual behavior. I find that the size of
the bias depends on the composition of the
crowd: the home bias tends to be smaller when
more supporters of the visiting side attend the
match. This is consistent with the idea that
social approval and social sanctions have
countervailing effects on net social rewards.
We expect supporters of each side, who have
the common interest that their preferred team
achieves success, to work toward this common
goal by acclaiming favorable decisions of
the referee and by expressing dissatisfaction
with unfavorable referee decisions. Referees’
decisions hence evoke social approval from
supporters of the favored team and social
sanctions from the opponent side. A referee
who is not inherently biased, that is, who does
not derive intrinsic utility from a particular
match outcome and values social payoffs,
is expected to weight the social costs and
benefits.2. Dufwenberg and Lundholm (2001) argue that
social rewards mitigate moral hazard problems in the con-
text of unemployment insurance as the desire for social
respect induces higher search effort; Austen-Smith and
Fryer (2005) formulate a theory of peer effects; and Pren-
dergast and Topel (1996) show theoretically how social
influences can create distortions in an agency model.
3. Empirical work on social interactions is plagued by
identification problems, which arise due to the complex
relationships in interaction-based models. Consequently,
data requirements for empirical testing are high. Brock
and Durlauf (1999) review the empirical work on interac-
tion-based models and provide a detailed discussion of the
problems that arise in this literature.
4. Other studies have provided evidence that reveals
innate bias, that is, intrinsic preferences for discrimina-
tion, among arbitrators who should be impartial. For
example, Goldin and Rouse (2000) analyze data from
auditions of symphony orchestras and find suggestive evi-
dence for sex-biased hiring decisions. Knowles, Persico,
and Todd (2001) derive a test that allows to distinguish
between statistical discrimination and prejudice (i.e., a
taste for discrimination); their empirical analysis uncovers
clues for prejudiced racial discrimination if particular
assumptions about individuals’ utility functions are made.
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Strikingly, home team favoritism is found
to be stronger when the match takes place
in a stadium without a running track, that
is, when the crowd is physically closer to the
field and to the referee, in which case the inten-
sity of social pressure is arguably higher.5 This
finding lends support for the conjecture that
social forces influence the referees’ decision,
be it because social pressure from the crowd
directly triggers-biased refereeing or because
of a more oblique channel, in which, for
example, the crowd creates an atmosphere
that encourages the players on the field to
exert pressure on the referee. Since the nature
of biased refereeing is affected by the crowd’s
proximity to the field, we can dismiss an alter-
native mechanism that leads to home-biased
decisions, namely that the DFB condones
the preferential treatment of home teams or
even instructs its referees to favor home
teams. Even a soccer association with strong
preferences for nondiscriminatory competi-
tion might rationally accept home-biased
refereeing as long as the referees’ preferential
treatment was exactly the same for all home
teams such that the resulting home advantage
would balance out over the season and there-
fore would not affect the outcome of the
championship. This could be an optimal
policy to maximize gate revenues if attendance
was boosted when the home team is more
likely to win, as Garicano, Palacios-Huerta,
and Prendergast (2005) discuss. However,
given the fact that teams who play in stadiums
with an athletics track are affected differently
than teams who play in a stadium without
a track, this mechanism is implausible.
In fact, the DFB monitors the quality of
refereeing and sacks a referee if he is detected
to be biased so that being partial lowers
reappointment probabilities.6 Since remuner-
ation amounted to more than 3,000 Euros
(;US$4,000) per match at the end of the
observation period, biased refereeing entails
substantial expected pecuniary losses for
umpires. This suggests that referees are induced
to favoritism by social forces, although they
have a strong intrinsic motivation for impar-
tiality. In summary, the findings indicate that
social groups can influence individuals to work
toward achieving an outcome desired by that
group (and to adhere to the groups’ social
norm) even if individuals do not derive utility
from the outcome and adherence to the norm
is diametrically opposed to their own private
interest.
The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. Section II provides some institutional
background and describes the data. Section III
presents the empirical results and Section IV
concludes.
II. BACKGROUND AND DATA
The data were made available for scientific
use by IMP—Innovative Medientechnik und
Planung AG, a company that maintains the
official soccer database of the DFL Deutsche
Fußball Liga GmbH, the German soccer league
association, and cover all 3,519 matches that
were played in the German premier soccer
league (1. Bundesliga) since the start of the sea-
son 1992/1993 until the first half of the season
2003/2004). IMP AG sends several observers
to each league match who record about
2,000 actions per match, including all goals,
shots on goal, tackles, passes, corner kicks,
every single ball contact, yellow and red cards,
as well as the number of injury treatments on
the field. Various match statistics are provided
separately for both periods of the match,
including the amount of stoppage time in each
half. The data also record the date, destina-
tion, and outcome of the match, the number
of spectators, and the referee’s identity.
The 1. Bundesliga consists of 18 teams that
compete for the national soccer champion-
ship. Teams play each other twice a season,
once during rounds 1–17 and once during
rounds 18–34 when the status of home and
visiting team is reversed.7 The outcome of
a match (i.e., a win, a draw, or a loss) deter-
mines the number of points that are allocated
to the teams: no points are allocated to the
loser of a match, while each team receives
one point in case of a draw. The reward for
winning a match was raised from two to three
points at the start of the season 1995/1996. The
accumulated number of points during a season5. Festinger, Schachter, and Back (1950) find that
physical distance is a key determinant of the intensity
of social interaction.
6. This was confirmed by the DFB upon request. The
DFB official was reluctant to state why particular referees
were not reappointed in the past.
7. A round consists of nine matches, which are typi-
cally played on weekends.
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determines the league ranking, and the team
that finishes the season at the top of the rank-
ing (i.e., the team that has accumulated most
points) wins the German soccer champion-
ship.8 The three lowest ranking clubs of the
championship table are relegated to the
second division (2. Bundesliga) and are re-
placed by the three highest ranking teams
from the second division.9
The referees for 1. Bundesliga matches are
appointed by the DFB and receive a piece rate
for refereeing. This piece rate has risen over
time: from July 1992 (i.e., at the start of the
observation period) until July 1997, referees
received 2,500 German Marks (DM) per
match; from August 1997 until July 2000, they
were paid 4,000 DM per match; and since
August 2000, the reward is 6,000 DM or
3,067.75 Euros per match. In addition, travel
expenses (including hotel and transportation)
have been fully covered during the entire
period since 1992. Bundesliga referees are ex-
perienced and have been selected in sequential
promotion tournaments. After having passed
a written and a physical test, referees typically
start in the lowest division. Once they have
been promoted to referee in the Landesliga,
the sixth division, they can be promoted at
most one division each year if judged as qual-
ified by official observers. In total, 73 umpires
have refereed at least 1 of the 3,519 games
in our sample. The number of referees in the
1. Bundesliga has been limited to 22 since
1995. Previously, the DFB had appointed
up to 36 referees each season.
The performance of referees is monitored
and judged by an official observer of the
DFB referee committee, who attends the
match in the stadium and fills a performance
evaluation form afterward. The first item in
this evaluation addresses the referee’s appear-
ance during the game, in particular whether
the referee was decided, secure, and had the
courage to take unpopular decisions, or
whether he was impressed by complaining
players.10 The second and third points of the
evaluation form concern how well the referee
interpreted and implemented the Laws of the
Game and additional instructions. This covers
the adequacy of the referee’s allowance for time
lost (see Linn 2003).
Information on the frequency of match
interruptions for injury treatments on the field
makes it possible to control for the ‘‘appro-
priate’’ amount of stoppage time, which is
a key determinant of stoppage time according
to the official rules, the Laws of the Game,
which are authorized by the International
Football Association Board and established
by the Fe´de´ration Internationale de Football
Association. According to Law 7 of the Laws
of the Game (Fe´de´ration Internationale de
Football Association 2002, 19), ‘‘[a]llowance
is made in either period for all time lost
through: substitution(s), assessment of injury
to players, removal of injured players from
the field of play for treatment, wasting time,
any other cause. The allowance for time lost
is at the discretion of the referee.’’ Data on
the number of corner kicks, goal kicks, and yel-
low or red cards allow to control for events that
according to Linn (2003) might result in ‘‘wast-
ing time’’ by impeding a quick restart of play.
Information on the correctness of decisions
to award penalty kicks is available for all 857
penalty kicks that were called since the start of
the season 1993/1994 (i.e., when IMP started
to collect this information), while there is
information on decisions to award goals for
all but 3 of the 10,166 goals that had been
awarded since the start of the season 1992/
1993. Data on decisions not to award a goal
have only been collected since 1993 and cover
all but one of the 463 situations in which a goal
was not accepted. Information on the decision
not to award a penalty kick is only recorded
since the start of the season 1998/1999. Until
January 2004, 892 critical situations, in which
suspicious action took place in one of the pen-
alty areas, had been evaluated. Specialists of
IMP AG assess the correctness of these deci-
sions after each match, relying on video
recordings and considering about 30 pieces
8. If two ormore teams are tied on points, the superior
goal difference and then the higher number of goals deter-
mine which team is ranked in higher position of the league
table.
9. Apart from winning the championship or avoiding
relegation, there are other important sporting and finan-
cial incentives to finishing in high ranks of the champion-
ship table because the rankings determine eligibility for
various football club competitions on the European level
of which the Union of European Football Associations
Champions League is the most lucrative and prestigious.
10. As all these points concern how referees deal with
the social environment on the field, performance in a social
environment seems to be a critical issue for the evaluation
and appointment of referees. These evaluations pay no
explicit attention to whether the referee’s decisions are
affected by the social environment created by the crowd.
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of detailed information in their judgment. A
decision is classified as ‘‘correct’’ if the evalua-
tors consent that it was correct. Likewise,
a decision is labeled ‘‘wrong’’ if they agree that
it was wrong, and the decision is classified as
‘‘disputable’’ if their verdict is not unanimous.
III. RESULTS
The empirical analysis starts with an in-
vestigation of stoppage time decisions, which
proceeds in three steps. Using data on 12 soc-
cer seasons and including additional control
variables for match interruptions like the
number of fouls and the number of actual
injury treatments on the field, I first replicate
the analysis by Garicano, Palacios-Huerta,
and Prendergast (2005) to assess whether there
is evidence for referee bias in the German data.
If the social pressure hypothesis is correct, we
expect that referees, in the pursuit of social
rewards from the home crowd, award more
stoppage time when the home team is behind
in score.We also expect this bias to be stronger
when more is at stake, for example, when the
score margin is close or when second half
rather than first-half stoppage time is con-
cerned. In these cases, the expected marginal
effect of additional time on thematch outcome
is larger, and consequently, crowd pressure is
likely to be stronger. A model of social inter-
action, in which material consumption and
social payoffs are substitutes (e.g., Bernheim
1994), predicts that deviation from intrinsic
goals is less pronounced when social rewards
become relatively less important. In a second
step, I analyze whether the composition of
the crowd matters, an issue that Garicano,
Palacios-Huerta, and Prendergast (2005) also
addressed. Since supporters of the home team
and the visiting team have conflicting goals,
we should expect a larger share of visiting
team supporters to attenuate the home bias
if the social pressure hypothesis is correct
because one group’s social approval counter-
vails the other group’s social sanctions.
In the third step, I study a new aspect of
crowd attributes, namely whether physical
proximity affects the size of the bias. Given
the presumption that the intensity of crowd
pressure is higher if the distance between the
crowd and the referee is smaller, we hypothe-
size that the home bias becomes stronger when
the crowd is closer to the field. Since stoppage
time decisions account for only one way
among many others in which the referee can
favor a particular team, I investigate referees’
impartiality concerning another crucial set of
decisions in the game, namely decisions to
approve goals and to award penalty kicks.
A. Stoppage Time Decisions
The first piece of evidence for biased stop-
page time decisions is presented graphically in
Figure 1, which plots kernel density estimates
of second-half stoppage time distributions
conditional on the score difference (defined
as the number of goals scored by the home
team minus the number of goals scored by
the visiting side).11 It is apparent that the
amount of stoppage time awarded at the end
of 90 min regulation time depends on the
score difference and on the identity of the
team. Most stoppage time is awarded in close
matches when the score margin is 1. Referees
also seem to use their discretionary power to
systematically award more stoppage time to
the home team in close matches as the esti-
mated stoppage time distribution conditional
on the home team being one goal behind
stochastically dominates all other estimated
conditional stoppage time distributions.12
When the match is decided at the end of
regulation time, that is, when one team is
ahead by two goals or more, the amount of
stoppage time does not depend on the identity
of the leading team and less time is added.
Interestingly, supporters have much weaker
incentives to influence the referee in decided
matches in which the ultimate match outcome
is unlikely to change during stoppage time.
Hence, the raw data are consistent with the
hypothesis that referee’s decisions are affected
by social forces. In the following analysis of
stoppage time decisions, I concentrate on close
games to further investigate the forces that
lead referees to make biased decisions.
11. Garicano, Palacios-Huerta, and Prendergast
(2005) proposed this classification of matches. Duggan
and Levitt (2002) follow a similar approach of looking
at the ‘‘relevant margin’’ in their study of corruption in
Sumo wrestling tournaments.
12. The results documented in Figure 1 are largely in
accordance with Garicano, Palacios-Huerta, and Prender-
gast (2005)’s findings except for the fact that Spanish ref-
erees seem to award more stoppage time when a match is
drawn than when the visiting team is behind by one goal;
the opposite is true in the German data.
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Estimates from ordinary least squares
regressions reported in Panel A of Table 1
confirm the descriptive results that more stop-
page time is granted when the home team is
one goal behind than in matches in which
the home team is one goal ahead at the end
of second-half regulation. The home bias in
awarding stoppage time, which is measured
by the coefficient on the ‘‘Home Ahead’’
dummy that takes the value of 1 if the home
team is one goal ahead and 0 if the home team
is one goal behind at the end of the first half,
amounts to about 22 sec of additional stop-
page time.13 This difference in stoppage time
is statistically significant at the 1% level, even
controlling for factors that should affect the
amount of stoppage time according to the
Laws of the Game, such as the number of
injury treatments, substitutions, and cards
(Column 1). Actual injury treatments on the
field have the expected positive effect on the
duration of stoppage time, but the effect is
small; referees add about 6 sec of extra time
for each time a player has been yellow
carded.14 The home bias remains statistically
significant and its size is virtually unchanged
when allowing for season-specific effects and
controlling for other potentially confound-
ing factors such as the relative number of
shots on goal, fouls, corner kicks, crosses,
and other proxies for relative strength
(Table 1, Column 2, and table notes for
FIGURE 1
Kernel Density Estimates of the Second-Half Stoppage Time for
Various Score Differences
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Note: The figure shows kernel density estimates of second-half injury time distributions conditional on the score line at
the end of regulation time.
13. On average, 0.05 goals are scored during eachmin-
ute of stoppage time so that the impact of the bias might
seem small. However, this can be argued since goals scored
in the last seconds of a match might have enormous con-
sequences. For example, FC Bayern Mu¨nchen won the
German championship in 2001 due to a goal they scored
during injury time in the last match of the season.
14. Very similar coefficient estimates, which are
reported in Table 3 of the working paper version
(Dohmen 2005), are found in drawn matches. Interest-
ingly, referees also tend to favor the home team by
lengthening drawn matches in which the home team is
more likely to score next. In addition, games end about
10 sec earlier on average when neither team had scored
during regulation time and matches with more shots on
goal, more tackles, and more crosses last longer. This
indicates that referees lengthen more exciting matches,
potentially being influenced by spectators who like
suspense.
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details) as well as team- and referee-fixed
effects (Column 3).15
Pressure from the crowd is arguably less
intense at the end of the first half when fans
might still have hope and faith that their team
at least levels the score in the second half. This
gives rise to the hypothesis that first-half stop-
page time decisions are less biased, but that
delays of the match, which should be com-
pensated for by stoppage time according to
the official rules, have the same impact on the
length of stoppage time in both halves. The
regression results in Panel B of Table 1 support
this hypothesis: the home bias in awarding
stoppage time is generally much smaller in
the first half compared to the second half.
Explanatory variables that capture match
delays, in contrast, have similar effects in both
halves.16
The systematic differential treatment of
home and visiting teams in second-half stop-
page time decisions is less pronounced in
the German Bundesliga than in the Spanish
Primera Division, where home teams are
granted about 113 sec more of stoppage time
in close matches (Garicano, Palacios-Huerta,
and Prendergast 2005). Home teams might be
favored less in Germany because relatively
more visiting supporters accompany their
team to away matches in Germany, where
the opponents’ home cities are typically geo-
graphically less distant than in Spain. This
conjecture entails that countervailing social
forces mitigate referee bias. Since the data
do not contain information about crowd com-
position, I construct two proxy variables that
exploit the fact that supporters are more likely
to accompany their team to away matches the
shorter the traveling distance is. The first vari-
able proxies the traveling distance of fans who
live close to their home team’s city by the lin-
ear distance between opponents’ home cities
and is calculated based on coordinates.17 Fans
living close to their preferred team’s home city
account for a substantial part of supporters, as
is evident by the geographical distribution of
fan clubs of German soccer teams. The second
proxy variable is a measure of relative popu-
larity and accounts for traveling distance of
another group of visiting team’s supporters,
namely those who live close to the away match
location (and potentially further away from
their team’s home city). Since more popular
teams have more fans nationwide, the number
of fans who live close to any match location is
positively correlated with a team’s popularity,
which Imeasure by the attendance-to-capacity
ratio in away matches.18 The relative popular-
ity index is calculated as the ratio of the aver-
age attendance-to-capacity ratio in the visiting
team’s awaymatches to the average attendance-
to-capacity ratio in the home team’s home
matches.Sincethe lineardistanceandtheattrac-
tiveness of the visiting team have a positive and
statistically significant effect on match atten-
dance, we can be confident that the two proxy
variables capture variation in the composition
of the crowd.19
15. Note that the regression results indicate that
a large fraction of the variation in stoppage time remains
unexplained in the specification in Column 3, even though
the regression includes controls for the host of variables
that are explicitly mentioned in theLaws of the Game. This
might reflect the fact that the amount of time that is wasted
varies even for a particular type of match interruption, for
example, yellow carding a player, so that control variables
are only an imperfect measure of the actual time lost in
a particular instance. But the size of the unexplained var-
iation also provides suggestive evidence of the importance
of referee discretion in stoppage time decisions.
16. Social pressure exerted by the crowd is likely to
increase not only toward the end of the game but also
toward the end of the season, whenmore is at stake so that
the difference in stoppage time awarded in close matches is
expected to be larger toward the end of the season. While
this difference widens by about 10 sec in the last five
rounds compared to earlier rounds, this increase is not
statistically significant at conventional levels.
17. Linear distances are obtained using the program
on http://www.koordinaten.de/online/dist_wel.shtml (last
seen on July 11, 2007).
18. The constructed popularity index varies slightly
for a given team because observations on matches that
involve both opponents are neglected when calculating
this measure. Reassuringly, this proxy for popularity is
highly correlated with the number of fan clubs of the
different teams throughout the country. In fact, the
four highest ranked teams according to the constructed
popularity index are FC Bayern Mu¨nchen, Borussia
Dortmund, Schalke 04, and Borussia Mo¨nchengladbach,
arguably the most popular teams in Germany, and
certainly those with most supporters’ clubs.
19. An increase of 0.1 in the popularity index of the
away team raises attendance by about 4,900 visitors.
The effect of distance is nonlinear: compared to the refer-
ence case in which opponents’ home towns are 300–450
km apart, 4,638 more spectators are on average attracted
if the distance between the opponents’ home towns is less
than 150 km and 865 additional spectators attend when
this distance is between 150 and 300 km, while there is
no statistically significant difference in attendance when
the distance is even longer. Detailed results are reported
in the working paper version (Dohmen 2005).
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To assess whether the size of the home bias
depends on the composition of the crowd, I
estimate the regression model from Column 3
of Table 1 separately for matches in which
both teams come from cities that are less than
150 km apart and cities that are further apart.
At the same time, I augment the regression
model with an interaction term between the
score difference and a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the visiting team’s relative popularity
is in the upper third of the distribution. The
regression results in Table 2 reveal that the
home bias is negligible and statistically not dif-
ferent from zero if the distance between the cit-
ies is less than 150 km, unless the visiting team
is relatively popular (see Column 1). When the
cities are further than 150 km apart, the home
bias (about 24 sec of additional stoppage time
when the home team is behind in score) is sta-
tistically significant (see Column 2).20 These
findings support the social pressure hypothesis.
To investigate next whether the intensity of
social pressure, as measured by distance
between the crowd and the field, affects the
size of the bias, I exploit the fact that some
teams play their home matches in stadiums
in which an athletics track separates the stands
from the field, while other teams play their
home matches in stadiums without such a
running track. Table 3 reports separate regres-
sions for matches that take place in stadiums
with a running track and for matches that take
place in stadiums without a track. The regres-
sions include controls for crowd size in addition
to the set of explanatory variables of Specifica-
tion (3) in Table 1. The variable of interest is the
‘‘Score difference,’’ which equals 1 if the home
team is one goal ahead and 1 if it is one goal
behind. The results indicate that the estimated
difference in stoppage time awarded in close
matches amounts to almost 1 min (twice the
coefficient on Score difference) of additional
stoppage time when the match takes place in
a stadium without a running track (Column
1). However, when the match takes place in
a stadium in which a running track separates
the stands from the field, this effect is much
weaker and statistically not significant. This
finding indicates that physical distance extenu-
ates the bias in stoppage time decisions, suggest-
ing that the intensity of crowd pressure is an
important determinant of referee favoritism.21
This empirical result provides additional new
support for the hypothesis that social forces
affect referees’ decisions.
B. Decisions to Award Goals and Penalty Kicks
Since goals and penalty kicks have a much
more immediate impact on the ultimate
match outcome than additional playing time,
I examine next whether referees also favor
TABLE 2
The Effects of Crowd Composition
Distance
150 km
Distance
.150 km
(1) (2)
Score difference 4.199 (8.237) 12.055*** (2.590)
Attraction 
score
difference
20.335* (11.704) 3.596 (4.170)
Observations 199 918
R2 .58 .34
Notes:Ordinary least squares estimates. The dependent
variable is second-half stoppage time in close matches. The
regressions include controls for the number of treatments,
substitutions, fouls, and cards and controls for relative
strength, season dummies, referee dummies, and teamdum-
mies. The variable ‘‘Attraction  score difference’’ is the
product of the Score difference variable, which takes the
value 1 if the home team is one goal behind and 1 if
the home team is one goal ahead at the end of regulation
time, and a dummy that takes the value 1 if the visiting team
ranks in the top third of relative crowd composition index.
This index is equal to the ratio of the average attractiveness
of the visitor (i.e., the average attendance-to-capacity ratio
in all away games except those that are played on the cur-
rent opponent’s turf) to the average attendance-to-capacity
ratio in home games of the home team (calculated over all
home matches except for those against the current oppo-
nent). The variable ‘‘Distance’’ measures the shortest
distance between the home cities of opponents. Standard
errors are given in parentheses.
*Significant at the 10% level; ***significant at the 1% level.
20. This bias tends to be reduced if the visiting team
attracts more fans when playing away, but this effect is not
statistically significant.
21. The regression results also show that neither the
number of spectators nor the attendance-to-capacity ratio
significantly affects the length of stoppage time. Coeffi-
cient estimates for interactions between these variables
and the score difference indicator suggest that a higher
attendance-to-capacity ratio and a higher absolute num-
ber of spectators tends to reduce the home bias in stadiums
without a running track and to increase it in stadiums with
a running track. Alternative specifications, in which con-
trols for attendance and attendance-to-capacity ratio and
their interactions with the score difference are dropped
sequentially, indicate that a larger crowd and a higher
attendance-to-capacity ratio is required in stadiums with
a running track to induce referee bias. The difference in the
size of the home bias in stadiums with and without a run-
ning track disappears when both interaction terms are
excluded from the regression.
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home teams in decisions to award a goal or
a penalty kick. I begin by investigating the
correctness of goal and penalty kick deci-
sions when a goal or a penalty kick was
awarded. I then also take into account a sec-
ond type of misjudgment, namely not grant-
ing a goal or a penalty kick when it should be
awarded, by also considering critical situa-
tions that could have lead to a goal or a
penalty kick.
The raw data on ratings of correctness of ref-
eree judgments, summarized in Table 4A, indi-
cate that decisions to grant a goal are more
likely to be wrong or disputable when the goal
is awarded for the home team: 95.99% of goals
scored by the visiting team, but only 95.05% of
goals scored by the home team are rightly
awarded. This 0.94 percentage point difference
is statistically significant at the 5% level and
considerable in magnitude since it implies that
home teams were awarded 57 more goals based
onwrong or disputable decisions. Remarkably,
granted goals are less likely to be correctly
awarded when a team is behind in score, espe-
cially when the home team is behind. The home
team is particularly likely to be granted a goal
based on a wrong or disputable decision if it is
behind by one or two goals.
Referees also seem to favor home teams in
penalty kick decisions (see also Sutter and
Kocher 2004). The raw data reveal that
a smaller fraction of penalties kicks for the
home team is rightly awarded (65.20% vs.
72.57%, see Table 4B).22 Observed differences
in the frequencies of wrong, correct, and dis-
putable decisions are statistically significant.23
Again, the fraction of wrong or disputable
decisions in favor of the home team is largest
when the home team is behind in score. How-
ever, it must be noted that referees also make
more disputable decisions in favor of the vis-
itor, when the visitor is just one goal behind.
TABLE 3
The Stadium, the Crowd, and Second-Half Stoppage Time in Close Games
Stadiums without Track Stadiums with Track
(1) (2)
Score difference 29.297** (13.938) 7.392 (7.569)
Attendance (in thousands) 0.986 (0.680) 0.367 (0.612)
Attendance  score difference 0.126 (0.231) 0.123 (0.223)
Ratio of attendance-to-capacity 39.833 (33.191) 8.775 (34.761)
Ratio of attendance-to-capacity  score difference 18.447 (18.257) 2.129 (14.381)
No. of treatments 1.499** (0.618) 0.412 (0.527)
No. of substitutions 2.941 (2.390) 1.250 (2.299)
No. of yellow cards 8.004*** (1.952) 5.943*** (1.737)
No. of 2nd yellow cards 3.135 (8.970) 1.419 (6.379)
No. of red cards 15.202 (9.831) 9.210 (7.328)
Constant 45.464 (52.650) 76.008 (46.951)
Observations 554 563
R2 .38 .41
Notes:Ordinary least squares estimate. The dependent variable is the length of stoppage time awarded at the end of the
match in matches where the home team is either one goal behind (Score difference 5 1) or one goal ahead (Score dif-
ference5 1). The sample is split into matches that took place in stadiums without a running track separating the field and
the stands (Column 1) and matches in stadiums with a running track (Column 2). All regressions include the same set of
controls for relative strength as in Table 1, as well as fixed effects for home teams, visiting teams, and referees. The effects
of controls for relative strength are never significant. The results concerning the home bias are not affected by the inclusion
or exclusion of team-fixed effects. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
**Significant at the 5% level; ***significant at the 1% level.
22. Home teams were awarded roughly twice as many
penalty kicks as visitors (569 vs. 288) during the seasons
from 1993/1994 until the first half of the season 2003/
2004. This difference largely results fromdifferent strategies:
there is simply more play in the visiting team’s penalty area.
Consequently, home teams are also more often involved in
critical situations in which no penalty kick was awarded.
23. The null hypothesis that observed differences are
purely due to random chance is rejected by a chi-square test
at the 10% significance level. The v2(2) statistic equals 4.75.
Groupingwrong and disputable decisions into one category
and testing for the significance of differences in the observed
frequencies of correct and not correct decisions for the
home and visiting team yields a v2(1) test statistic of 4.41
rejecting the null hypothesis that referees decide in the same
way for both teams at the 5% significance level.
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Probit estimates (not reported here) con-
firm that a correct goal decision is significantly
less likely when the home team has scored.
Interestingly, referees’ decisions to award
a goal are significantly less likely to be correct
when the match takes place in a stadium with-
out a running track that separates the stands
from the field. Likewise, a probit model for the
probability that a penalty kick was correctly
awarded reveals that a correct judgment is
10% less likely when the game takes place in
a stadium without a track.24
The evidence presented so far ignores situa-
tions in which a goal or a penalty kick was not
awarded. Information on the second type of
decisions is available since the start of the
season 1993/1994 for goal decisions and only
since the start of the season 1998/1999 for pen-
alty kick decisions. Including these situations,
we can classify goals and penalty kicks as
legitimate, disputable, or illegitimate in the
following way: goal (penalty kick) that should
be awarded according to the rules is a legiti-
mate goal (penalty kick); illegitimate goals
(penalty kicks) should not be awarded; and
disputable goals (penalty kicks) comprise
goals (penalty kicks) for which there is no
consensus regarding their legitimacy.
Table 5 summarizes referees’ goal and pen-
alty kick decisions for home and visiting teams
conditional on legitimacy. The first row of the
upper panel shows that there is no indication
that referees award the visitor fewer legitimate
goals. There is tentative but no statistically
TABLE 4
Correctness of Decisions to Award Penalties and Goals
(A) Decisions to Award a Goal
Score Difference
Goal for Home Team Decision Goal for Visiting Team Decision
Wrong Correct Disputable Wrong Correct Disputable
2 1.68 92.26 6.06 0.68 97.62 1.70
1 1.43 93.69 4.88 0.15 97.51 2.34
0 1.56 95.04 3.39 0.88 96.08 3.04
1 1.38 95.48 3.13 1.62 93.73 4.65
2 1.01 96.64 2.35 0.95 96.76 2.29
Total 1.43 95.05 3.52 0.92 95.99 3.09
(B) Decisions to Award a Penalty Kick
Score Difference
Penalty Kick for Home Team Decision Penalty Kick for Visiting Team Decision
Wrong Correct Disputable Wrong Correct Disputable
2 8.57 45.71 45.71 11.76 70.59 17.65
1 14.29 62.86 22.86 0.00 87.10 12.90
0 6.38 62.55 31.06 8.04 68.75 23.21
1 5.00 70.00 25.00 6.25 67.50 26.25
2 4.05 78.38 17.57 2.08 81.25 16.67
Total 7.38 65.20 27.42 5.90 72.57 21.53
Notes: The upper panel of the table shows the percentages of goals for the home team and the visiting team that were
wrongly, correctly, or disputably awarded by score difference. The information is based on all 10,163 goals (6,025 for the
home team and 4,138 for the visitor team) that were awarded from the start of the season 1992/1993 until the end of the first
half of the season 2003/2004 and for which the correctness indicator is available. The lower panel of the table shows the
percentages of awarded penalties for the home team and the visiting team that were wrongly, correctly, or disputably
awarded. The information is based on all penalties that were awarded from the start of the season 1993/1994 until
the end of the first half of the season 2003/2004 and covers 857 penalty kick decisions, 569 for the home team and
288 for the visitor team. The score difference is calculated as the number of goals that had been scored by the home team
minus the number of goals that had been scored by the visitor team at the time a decision was made.
24. This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Estimates from a multinomial logit model, in which the
categories of the dependent variable are a correct, disput-
able, or wrong decision, indicate that home teams are
more likely to be granted disputable goals and that deci-
sions in stadiums with a track are significantly less likely to
be wrong. The results also indicate that decisions that
favor the home team when it is behind by one or two goals
are more likely to be disputable than plainly wrong, which
squares with the fact that obvious misjudgment might
have strong negative repercussions for referees.
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significant evidence that referees grant the
visiting team fewer disputable goals, but the
home side is granted significantly (p 5 .07)
more illegitimate goals than the visiting side.25
The lower panel of the table reveals that visit-
ing teams are more likely to be denied a legit-
imate or a disputable penalty kick: the visiting
team was wrongly denied a legitimate penalty
kick in 35.75% of cases but the home team only
in 29.59% of cases. This preferential treatment
of the home team is statistically significant at
the 10% level as a one-sided nonparametric test
reveals (see last column of the first row in
Table 5B). In case of disputable penalty kick
decisions, the evidence for home team favorit-
ism is even more pronounced: home teams are
awarded 28.67% of disputable penalties but
visiting teams only 20.27%. Estimation results
based on these data (reported inDohmen 2005)
indicate that home teams are significantly more
likely to receive a penalty kick when it should
objectively be awarded and when a penalty call
is disputable. The estimates also show that ref-
erees tend to award fewer disputable and unjus-
tified penalty kicks when the crowd is separated
from the field by an athletics track.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has provided evidence that ref-
erees in German professional soccer, who are
appointed to be impartial, tend to make deci-
sions regarding stoppage time, penalty kicks,
and goals that favor the home team. Home-
biased refereeing is more pronounced when
the home crowd has a stronger interest in
a decision that favors their team, for example,
when the score margin is close and their team
is behind in score. There is also evidence that
the home bias is mitigated when the fraction of
supporters of the visiting team rises, which
indicates that conflicting social forces have
countervailing effects on individuals. Strik-
ingly, referees are more biased in stoppage
time decisions and make fewer correct penalty
kick and goal decisions if the match is played
in a stadium without a running track that sep-
arates the stands from the field. This indicates
that refereeing quality is impaired when the
crowd is closer and when social pressure is
arguably experienced as more intense by the
referee.
A likely channel that leads to the observed
systematic differences in referee decisions is
that social pressure from the crowd directly
affects the referee, who then departs from
the decision that maximizes his expected mate-
rial payoff. An alternative explanation for the
TABLE 5
Decisions to Award Penalties and Goals Conditional on Legitimacy
Home Team Visiting Team W-M-W Test
Awarded Denied Awarded Denied z Value p Value
(A) Decisions to award a goal
Legitimate 5,199 68 3,637 46 0.175 .569
Disputable 194 57 120 43 0.852 .197
Illegitimate 79 125 37 84 1.480 .070
(B) Decisions to award a penalty kick
Legitimate 207 87 115 64 1.393 .082
Disputable 86 214 30 118 1.906 .028
Illegitimate 23 192 13 87 0.597 .725
Notes: The upper panel of the table shows the numbers of legitimate, disputable, and illegitimate goals that were either
granted or denied for home and visiting teams during all seasons from 1993/1994 until the end of the first half of the season
2003/2004. The indicator for the correctness of the referee’s decision is missing for two goals that have been awarded in this
period and for one goal that has not been awarded. These observations are not includedwhen calculating the statistics. The
lower panel of the table shows the numbers of legitimate, disputable, and illegitimate penalty kicks that were either granted
or denied for home and visiting teams from the start of the season 1998/1999 until the end of the first half of the season
2003/2004. Statistics are based on ratings of all situations that led to penalty kicks and all critical actions that could have
potentially lead to a penalty kick but were not penalized. The last column of each panel shows p values for the hypothesis
that referees do not favor the home team against the one-sided alternative that they are more likely to award a goal (upper
panel) or a penalty (lower panel) for the home team. W-M-W, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney.
25. Home teams are most likely to be awarded a dis-
putable or illegitimate goal when being behind in score
(see table 9 in Dohmen 2005 for estimation results).
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pattern that close games last longest is that ref-
erees lengthen exciting games because specta-
tors like suspense (see Chan, Courty, and Li
2006 for a theoretical model). However, if this
was the mechanism it is not clear why there is
a systematic difference between close matches
in which the home team is behind and those in
which the home team is ahead, unless home
teams are generally more likely to level the
score when being behind by one goal. In
any event, this alternative transmission chan-
nel presupposes that referees submit to the
preferences of the crowd and would therefore
not undermine the evidence that social forces
affect individuals’ decisions. The finding that
refereeing quality is lower when no running
track separates the stands from the field adds
important new evidence that social pressure is
the mechanism at play. It also helps to inval-
idate the alternative hypothesis that the gov-
erning body, the DFB, condones home team
favoritism.
Another explanation emphasizes a more
indirect channel that leads to biased referee-
ing; it entails that the crowd pressure affects
the players on the field who then feel encour-
aged to complain about decisions that do not
favor their team. It is interesting to recall in
this context that the official observer of the
DFB referee committee, who completes the
evaluation form after the match, rates the ref-
eree’s decisiveness and his competence in
dealing with complaining players. As a result,
referees are expected not to entertain the
players complaints, which renders this indirect
channel less plausible. But even if the true
transmission mechanism worked through
players influencing the referees, the social
pressure hypothesis would not be invalidated;
it would in fact be at the heart of the explana-
tion. Regardless of the particular channel
through which referees’ decisions are affected,
the fact that the social atmosphere in the sta-
dium is related to refereeing quality is indicative
for the role of social forces. As a result, we can
conclude that the evidence is consistent with the
hypothesis that social forces can affect the deci-
sions of an individual who values not only
material payoffs but also social payoffs.
These results are important for the litera-
ture on endogenous preference formation
for they provide support for theories that
emphasize the relevance of the social environ-
ment (e.g., Akerlof 1980; Becker and Murphy
2000; Bernheim 1994). Bernheim’s model
implies that we should expect a stronger influ-
ence of the social environment when social
pressure rises relative to the individual’s
material payoff. This is likely the case in lower
leagues, where monetary rewards for referees
are lower. In fact, a DFB official has con-
firmed that referees in lower level leagues
are regularly relegated or dismissed, but that
dismissal or relegation is less common for
Bundesliga referees. TheDFBofficial attributed
this to incentives effects arguing that ‘‘much
more is at stake for Bundesliga referees’’ and
to selection effects saying that Bundesliga ref-
erees are ‘‘simply better referees as they have
been promoted from lower leagues in several
rounds upon very positive judgements of
DFB observers.’’ The latter statement implies
that there is considerable heterogeneity in the
extent to which individuals are affected by
social pressure. There is evidence in the data
that more experienced referees tend to be less
biased, which suggests that individuals can
learn to resist social pressure.
To understand how and to what extent
individuals can become immune to social
influences, it is important to ascertain whether
referees consciously submit to social pressure
or whether they are affected subconsciously.
The latter conjecture appears to be more
plausible. It is likely that referees’ objective
judgment capabilities are impaired by the
emotional atmosphere in the stadium. Consis-
tent with that explanation, Nevill, Balmer, and
Williams (2002) have provided experimental
evidence that soccer referees are affected by
the crowd’s noise. They showed videotaped
tackles from an English Premier League soccer
game to qualified referees who had to decide
whether or not to award a foul. One group
watched the videotape without the noise of
the crowd being played, while the other group
heard the noise. The latter group called 15.5%
fewer fouls against the home team. Since
referees have to judge a situation in a split
of a second having very little time for deliber-
ation, their decision-making process might be
heavily influenced by cues in the environment
and the atmosphere in the stadium.
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